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AGAINST BAR INTEGRATION
By ALBERT L. VOGL, of the Denver Bar
HE term "Integrated Bar" is generally used to designateTbar associations established by legislative acts or judicial
orders as distinguished from voluntary bar associations.
Membership in integrated bars is compulsory.
The usual procedure to establish an "Integrated Bar" is
to have the Legislature adopt a statute authorizing the incor-
poration of the bar, and vesting in this incorporated bar vari-
ous powers, such as power to collect dues from all enrolled
members of the bar to defray the expenses of carrying on the
work of the corporation; power to appoint a governing
board; power to hear complaints against members of the bar
and to recommend to the Supreme Court action upon such
complaints. Sometimes the procedure is varied and the Legis-
lature authorizes the Supreme Court to prescribe rules and
regulations for organizing and governing the bar association
and to prescribe the powers thereof; again, in other cases the
Supreme Court has provided for an integrated bar, without
action by the Legislature.
The essential features of all bar integration plans are,
first, that the bar organizations become officially a part of the
State government; second, that membership therein is com-
pulsory and every lawyer must pay an excise tax to support
the integrated bar. The benefits generally claimed for this
form of organization are: (1) That integrated bar associa-
tions are sufficiently financed to carry on the work of the asso-
ciation; (2) that since every lawyer must contribute to the
funds of the association, a considerably larger percentage of
lawyers actively participate in the work of integrated bars
than participate in the activities of voluntary associations;
(3) that because of (1) and (2) the integrated associations
work more effectively, and particularly are more efficient in
compelling observation of bar ethics.
Before considering these supposed benefits, it is appro-
priate that we should examine the underlying principles
involved in bar integration. Legislation providing for bar
integration has generally been sustained as an appropriate
exercise of the police powers (In re Gibson, 4 Pac. 2d 643).
Those, therefore, who advocate bar integration must contend
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that the bar needs policing and then argue, that the bar is the
proper organization to appoint the police. If a trades union,
let us say, the United Mine Workers, should propose a law
providing that (1) no one could work in or about a coal mine
in Colorado except he joins the union and continues his mem-
bership by regular payment of dues to be fixed by the union;
(2) the union elects its own officers; (3) the union adopts its
own rules and regulations defining what is ethical in coal min-
ing and the union shall have full control of its funds, that
union would be proposing nothing different, in principle,
from the proposition of an integrated bar. In all other pro-
fessions or trades which are regulated under the police powers,
the appointment of the members of the regulating body is left
to the governor, sometimes with the approval of the senate,
or to some other governmental agency. Thus the governor
appoints the medical board, the dental board and he appoints
the public utilities board with the consent of the senate. The
advocates of bar integration, however, propose to invoke the
police powers of the State to create the integrated bar and give
it powers to levy excise taxes, then they propose to vest in the
bar-not representing the people or the State-the power to
name the governing board of the bar, which will have wide
powers, including those of disbursing the proceeds of this
excise tax.
The bar is a part of the judicial branch of the govern-
ment and, obviously, if under the police powers of the State
there is to be a governing board appointed for it, the appoint-
ment should be with that body which the people have elected
to have general superintending control over the judicial
branch of the government, the Supreme Court. Any propo-
sition of a governmental agency, not under the control of
elected officials, being vested with police powers and taxing
powers, and the power to spend the proceeds of taxes levied
by itself, is so new and startling that it must come as a shock
to thosi who still approve the general principles of democratic
government.
The advocates of integration of the bar usually contrast
the inefficiency of bar associations with the control of the med-
ical profession by the American Medical Association and by
the State and local medical associations. It should be noted
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that these medical associations are not "integrated" associa-
tions-but are voluntary and selective. If these voluntary
medical associations have elevated the standards of the medical
profession above those of the legal profession (which, I sub-
mit, is open to very serious question), the alleged success in
that regard is, therefore, no argument that by substituting
compulsory bar associations for the voluntary associations,
the standards of the bar will be raised to the standards sup-
posed to be achieved by the medical profession, acting through
voluntary associations.
Let us now examine some of the reasons urged for the
establishment of an integrated bar. It is claimed that recent
events have emphasized the necessity of curbing unethical
activities of members of the bar; that the legal profession is
losing the confidence of the public by reason of such unethical
activities.
The unethical conduct of some members of the bar has
been exaggerated by propaganda of the press and by bar asso-
ciation officials advocating bar integration. There has been an
increase of criminal activities resulting from a World War, a
major depression, sensational romanticizing of crime by press
and movies, and this has centered public attention on "crime."
The press has drawn attention to the lawyers-in order to
divert attention of the public from the part the press has
played in the increase in crime. So the lawyers have taken the
blame and bar association officials interested in bar integra-
tion have joined in the propaganda against lawyers. The loss
of public confidence is traceable to three main causes: (a)
Present legal procedure is cumbersome and impracticable and
the lawyers have not remedied these defects; (b) the 1929
economic breakdown was in many respects traceable to bank-
ing and corporate dishonesty and lawyers were the advisers of
those responsible for those dishonesties, and bar associations
are not actively denouncing such legal advisers; (c) excessive
dramatic publicity and exaggeration of the activities of attor-
neys representing the underworld has resulted in the public
blaming the bar not only for its share in the handling of the
problem of the underworld, but also for the incompetencies of
the police and other officials. No one disputes that the bar
is vulnerable in the matter of the relation of some of its mem-
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bers to the underworld, but those opposed to bar integration
claim, as above stated, that this relationship has been exagger-
ated and sometimes used as a herring across the trail to divert
attention from some equally sinister connections of members
of the bar with the upperworld of high finance. The present
methods of lawyers who represent defendants in criminal
cases differ very little from the methods used in the nineteenth
century. The outcry against the lawyers, therefore, is not
due to a new technique in criminal defense, but is due to an
aroused sentiment against crime increases.
It is next urged that if reforms are needed in the bar,
lawyers, because of their training and experience, are best
fitted to solve the problems involved.
The primary interest of lawyers as a class (though not
always individually) is in the practice of law as their profes-
sion and therefore their self-interest will, in many cases, out-
weigh their judgment as to what is for the social good. In
principle it is wrong for practicing lawyers to sit in judgment
on their competitors, i. e., other practicing lawyers. The re-
sponsibility and function of disciplining recreant lawyers
belongs in the courts and the courts can always call to their
assistance in such matters such members of the bar as the
courts may determine are best suited to be of assistance in such
matters. The courts represent the public, in whose interest
such reforms are to be made. Why divide the responsibility?
Next it is contended that an adequately financed bar
association is necessary if it is to effectually enforce high stand-
ards of ethical conduct in the profession, and that adequate
financing of bar associations can only be accomplished
through integration of the bar. Obviously it is a confession
of weakness when bar officials admit they are not able to get
voluntary members into the association, and therefore ask for
compulsory measures to increase membership.
What constitutes an adequately financed bar association
is a matter of opinion; already we hear murmurs against high
salaries paid by the American Bar Association and excessive
expenditures for propaganda put out by that organization.
An integrated bar is just another bureaucracy-an N. R. A.
among lawyers-and will be in the control of not the best
element of the bar, but of the professional bureaucrat or office-
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seeker. Compulsory payment of bar association dues will be
the inspiration for the establishment of a swarm of paid office
holders in the associations.
The advocates of bar integration contend that every law-
yer should be a member of his State bar association and should
participate in the work of that association; that this can be
brought about only when every lawyer is compelled to pay
dues to the association.
Quality and not quantity is what is needed in bar asso-
ciation work; every lawyer who pays property and/or income
taxes does not actively participate in political activities, and
because every lawyer has to pay a membership fee in a bar
association does not guarantee that every lawyer will partici-
pate in its work. Under voluntary associations less than half
of those who pay dues, regularly attend bar meetings and are
active in the work of the association; probably under an inte-
grated bar the result will be the same. The official personnel
will probably be about the same as under a voluntary associa-
tion; if not-as you will force into the associations those
whose unorthodox professional standards now prevent them
from becoming members of voluntary associations-you may
get a less desirable official personnel than you now have. The
only thing that an integrated bar will assure in this regard
will be increased funds for the association.
It is claimed that an integrated bar is more effectual in
disciplinary activities than is a voluntary association.
In those states where in recent years an integrated bar has
been established, there has been more disciplinary activity
than was formerly manifested, probably because conditions
made necessary increased activities along such lines. In Colo-
rado-without an integrated bar-there has been more activ-
ity in this respect in the past five years than in the prior twen-
ty-five years; which shows that an integrated bar is not the
only way of arousing disciplinary activities when the same
become necessary. Primarily the duty of maintaining ethical
standards is one for the courts. The courts are elected by the
people-or are appointed by those elected by the people-and
are therefore the people's agency for administering disciplin-
ary measures to unethical members of the bar. Bar association
committees or governing boards are not elected by, or in any
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manner responsible to the people, therefore they are not likely
to have the confidence of the people. Give the Supreme Court
the fullest powers in matters of discipline, with full authority
to call to its assistance permanent committees appointed by it,
or individuals selected by it from time to time. The results
will be more satisfactory, there will be no division of respon-
sibility, and the public will have more confidence in the ad-
ministration of discipline by its own elected officials than it
will have where the responsibility for the initial investigation
is in the hands of a bar committee in no manner subject to the
control of the people, and often elected or appointed by a
small clique in the bar association itself.
It is generally conceded that judicial procedure needs
amending, so that justice can be more certainly and speedily
administered with less likelihood of such administration being
frustrated by intricate technicalities. The advocates of bar
integration claim that the lawyer's training adapts him to the
formulation of such amendment. They claim that unless
such amendments are made, the public confidence in our courts
will be undermined, and that this work must have the united
efforts of all lawyers, and that this united activity can only be
secured by an integrated bar.
All will agree that a legal system where four to nine
months can be used up in determining how properly to state
a cause of action and a defense thereto, is inept and not a sys-
tem to be proud of. However, the work of reforming judicial
procedure is not one to be undertaken by mass attack; it re-
quires the careful study of analytical minds peculiarly adapted
to that kind of activity. Our present judicial procedure is
almost entirely the product of legal minds, therefore many
doubt whether the work of amending judicial procedure
should be entrusted to lawyers alone; it is contended by many
that this work can only be accomplished with any degree of
success by groups composed of well-trained representatives of
various phases of our industrial, financial and social life, in
which groups lawyers should not be the controlling majority.
Even if lawyers are to undertake this work, obviously they
should be selected-not elected by majority vote of members
of an integrated bar. Without an integrated bar, the Supreme
Court of the United States found no difficulty in securing all
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of the assistance it required among the highest types of law-
yers to aid it in the work of preparing for submission to Con-
gress new rules of procedure for the Federal courts. The Su-
preme Court of each State could secure similar cooperation
within the State whenever it was desired. Of course the
question of finance comes in. If the lawyers must finance
either the work of disciplining the bar or of reforming judi-
cial procedure-logically, the State should finance it-then
lawyers could be required to pay to the Supreme Court an
annual license fee which could constitute a separate fund
solely for such purposes as enforcing disciplinary measures,
studying and formulating improvements in the procedure,
etc. This would not entail the setting up of an integrated bar
organization with numerous petty secretaries, committees,
officials, etc., with legalistic authority to regiment and dictate
to the bar.
At least let us try this method before we submit to this
process of compulsory bar organization and surrender the val-
uable social features of voluntary bar associations.
There are those advocates of bar integration who claim
that these social features can be retained under an integrated
bar. Obviously this claim is erroneous. The funds of an
integrated bar are proceeds of an excise tax and cannot be
expended for purposes other than public purposes.
Whatever may be the justification for integration of the
bars in such states as New York and California, no condition
exists in Colorado which calls for such drastic disciplining of
the bar of this State. Unless more convincing reasons are pre-
sented than have been heretofore advanced, Colorado should
hold on to its voluntary associations and refuse to be stam-
peded into compulsory associations by the paid advocates sent
out by the American Bar Association.
Some of the best public services which lawyers have ren-
dered to the American Commonwealth have resulted from the
free individualistic habits of thought of the American lawyer.
Regimentation of American lawyers in trade unions disguised
as "integrated bars" may-without improving either the eth-
ics of the bar or the efficiency of judicial procedure-stultify
this freedom of thought and speech among lawyers subjected
to this regimentation, and result in substituting Boeotian
mediocrity for scintillating omnilucence.
